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The overallotment or greenshoe option has become very popular in the German IPO market 
since its introduction in 1995 and is nowadays an important tool to stabilize IPOs or to issue 
additional shares in the case of excess demand. Besides providing evidence for the prevalence 
of price support activities by the underwriter we show that the greenshoe option which seems 
to be used to support overpriced offerings in the secondary market is not very effective in 
propping up aftermarket prices. Additionally, the market seems to decide quite early which 
firms are ‘losers’ and which are ‘winners’ in terms of stock market performance. 
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applies. 1 Introduction 
The analysis on initial public offerings (IPO, hereafter) has been a major stream of 
research in corporate finance for over 30 years. Most research focuses on the explanation of 
underpricing, hot-issue-markets and long-run underperformance (Loughran and Ritter, 1995). 
Recently, researchers have discovered another, due to lack of data and lack of transparency, 
less explored puzzle of underwriter activities in the secondary markets to support or stabilize 
IPOs and therefore influence the IPO price performance (Aggarwal, 2000).  
Aggarwal (2000) points out that a popular way of supporting IPOs during the first trading 
days is the combination of initially selling excess shares (e.g. 115%) and covering this short 
position using an overallotment option. This overallotment or greenshoe option, which has 
been named after the Greenshoe Manufacturing Company as this firm was the first to go 
public while using this type of a call option, allows the underwriter to buy additional shares 
(e.g. the 15% additionally sold) from the issuer at the issue price in order to meet excess 
demand. If on the other side demand is low and the stock price drops below the offer price the 
underwriter can, instead of using the greenshoe option, buy the stock in the secondary market 
and therefore support the performance of the IPO due to increased demand.  
Franzke and Schlag (2002) stress that greenshoe options have become very popular in 
Germany and are nowadays announced in nearly all initial offerings. As this tool for 
supporting IPOs dominates not only the Germany New Issue Market it is interesting to 
analyze its effectiveness in stabilizing newly issued stocks and, additionally, to analyze the 
impact on return patterns during the first weeks of trading.  
Before analyzing the usage of the greenshoe option for the first time we provide, 
following Ruud (1993), new evidence on underwriter price support by examining the 
distribution of first day returns. This analysis is supported by the study of the returns patterns 
during the first 30 trading days. In order to conduct this examination we group IPOs with an 
- 2 - initial return below 5% into different groups, as they are most likely supported by underwriter 
in the aftermarket ( Aggarwal, 2000).  
After providing some evidence for the presence of price support activities at the Frankfurt 
Stock Exchange we analyze the behavior of buy-and-hold returns of IPOs with initial returns 
during the first trading day between -5% and +5% and compare the results with IPOs with 
initial returns below -5%. In order to draw inference of the price impact of the overallotment 
we break down all IPOs into groups where the greenshoe option has been used, has not been 
used or has not been announced before the IPO. Summing up, we provide evidence, consistent 
with Aggarwal (2000), that the use of greenshoe options seems to be the tool to be used for 
stabilizing activities. Additionally, we provide evidence that overpriced IPOs decrease even 
more during the first 30 trading days and therefore support the idea of a negative cascade as 
discussed by Welch (1992).  
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a short overview of 
prior research and the reason why underwriter are supporting IPOs in the secondary market. 
Section 3 describes the data set and provides the empirical analysis for the existence of price 
support activities in Germany and the effectiveness of the overallotment with regard to price 
support by the underwriter. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
2  What do we know about aftermarket price 
support? 
Underwriters use price support to prop up aftermarket prices when the market price would 
decline without intervention (Schultz and Zaman, 1994). This argument is in line with the 
cascade theory discussed by Welch (1992), as potential buyers could change their mind in the 
absence of potential price support and therefore starting a negative cascade resulting in further 
price declines. 
- 3 - Aggarwal (2000) analyzes 114 IPOs between May to July 1997 and posses information on 
each short market transaction and whether penalty bids are part of the contracts and if they 
have been assessed. Due to this unique dataset this is the first comprehensive analysis of 
underwriter activities in the secondary market. Aggarwal (2000) discusses and analyses ‘pure’ 
stabilization, aftermarket short covering and penalty bids and finds that the first type is never 
performed by the intermediary, as theses transactions have to be identified due to SEC 
regulations, and that aftermarket short covering is the cardinal way to support newly issued 
stocks if they perform worse than expected. 
Contrary to Aggarwal (2000) most researchers have had to estimate which IPOs are 
supported in the aftermarket or use indirect measures to identify stabilizing activities due to a 
lack of data.  
Ruud (1993) bases her findings on the skewed distribution of the initial returns following 
the public offer. She discovers that instead of forming a symmetric curve centered over a 
positive mean, the distribution of one-day returns is found to peak rather steeply around a 
value close to zero and are heavily skewed to the right. We are therefore only able to observe 
the distribution of returns conditional on market stabilizations by underwriters, but not the 
unconditional return distribution, which means that relatively few IPOs sink much below their 
offering price immediately (Mihurko, 2000). Due to this, one could argue that the effect of 
such stabilizing activities is to reduce the number of negative initial returns from what would 
otherwise be observed. 
Ruud (1993) uses a sample of 463 IPOs occurring in 1982 and 1983 in her analysis. She 
found that one-fourth of the sample has a first-day return of zero and that the one-day return is 
heavily skewed to the right but this skewness gradually decreases in the first four weeks of 
trading. This effect is interpreted as the steady removal of underwriter’s price support. 
Further evidence for the aftermarket support of IPOs is provided by Schulz and Zaman 
(1994). They split their sample which covers 72 issues in 1992, at each point in time into ‘hot’ 
- 4 - and ‘cold’ IPOs. The first group referred to offerings that trade above their offering price and 
the latter to IPOs that trade below their offering price. Schulz and Zaman (1994) find, by 
examining the dealer quotes, that underwriters spend 86.1 % of the time at the inside bid
1 for 
‘cold’ issues but only 63.1 % of the time for ‘hot’ issues
2 by examining the aftermarket 
transactions from the first three trading days of 72 public offerings in 1992. Additionally, 
underwriters repurchase a surprising 20 % of their underwritten shares during the first three 
days of trading. The authors conclude that due to the volume of aftermarket repurchases, 
along with the exercise of overallotment options for ‘hot’ IPOs that stocks are supported in 
the aftermarket by permanently reducing the supply of shares. 
Asquith et. al. (1998), using the data of 560 firm-commitment IPOs between 1982 and 
1983, find that the cross-sectional distribution of one-day returns is modeled better as a 
combination of two distributions, with the parameter estimates on one distribution being 
consistent with underpricing and the other with price stabilization. 
Hanley et. al. (1993) examine 1,523 firm-commitment IPOs between 1982 and 1987 and 
provide indirect evidence of the existence of market stabilization through the behavior of bid-
ask spreads. In their model the investment banker’s stabilizing bid provides a put option to 
other dealers, therefore truncating losses at the floor price. An implication is that the put 
option reduces costs to market makers and therefore, ceteris paribus, IPOs undergoing 
stabilization should have narrower spreads. Supporting their model Hanley et al. (1993) find 
after adjusting for volume that the number of market makers, volatility, price and spreads are 
narrowest for IPOs that begin trading at prices 3 % below their offering price. Additionally, 
they found that for the aforementioned group of stocks, spreads widen and stock prices 
decrease over time. A similar result is found by Hedge and Miller (1989), who examined 540 
IPOs for the 1983 to 1984 period. They find that spreads are narrower for recent IPOs than for 
other stocks. 
                                                 
1 The inside bid is referred to the highest bid any trader will pay for the stock. 
2 A test for a difference in proportions between ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ IPOs yields a t-statistic of 3.64. 
- 5 - But who benefits from price support in the secondary market? Aggarwal (2000) points out 
that price support can reduce sales pressure created by flipping activities (i.e. investors who 
sell the stocks after a very short holding period) and is therefore beneficial for initial 
investors. As pointed out by Benveniste et. al. (1998), it is hard so see why underwriters 
should be willing to support issues in the aftermarket unless they clearly benefit from these 
activities directly in achieving profit or indirectly gaining a good reputation. They found, by 
examining the quantities sold in the first few trading days, that institutional trading is 
concentrated in the first day of trading and therefore conclude that the evidence is consistent 
with institutional investors being the primary beneficiaries of price stabilization effort. Partly 
in line with this argument would be Carter and Manaster (1990) who stated that overallotment 
options enables the underwriter to allocate additional shares of particularly attractive and 
oversubscribed shares to special clients. This would increase the underwriters prestige and 
reputation and also build a good client relationship. Smith (1986) discusses price support also 
in the context of underwriter’s reputation, stating that if an investment bank follows a policy 
of repurchasing ex-post overpriced shares, his reputation for aftermarket support assures that 
the IPOs that are underwritten in the future are apparent ex-ante as less likely to be 
overpriced. Hanley et. al. (1993) argue that underwriters may be willing to purchase shares 
even if they expect a significant price decline to allow favored customers to return overpriced 
stocks. The reason underling this argument is due to the fact that – at least in the United States 
– investors have the right to cancel an indication of interest or to renege even on firm orders 
within five trading days therefore giving underwriters a clear incentive to support issues in the 
after-market. This argument would also be in line with Welch’s (1992) cascade theory, as the 
renege would most likely cause a negative cascade. Additionally, Hanley et. al. (1993) point 
out that the underwriters may believe that stabilizing an issue might convey the sale of shares, 
which have not been distributed during the subscription period, in the after-market. Finally, 
Tinic (1988) argues that aftermarket support minimizes legal liability with the possibility of 
- 6 - legal liabilities giving an incentive to underprice IPOs as well as a reason for supporting a 
stock in the aftermarket. 
Given the above outlined reasons for the underwriters to support an IPO in the aftermarket 
and the fact that the greenshoe option has become so popular around the world it seems to be 
very important to analyze the effectiveness of this widely used tool. We focus, while 
analyzing the potential price impact of the overallotment for the first time, on the German 
stock market. But the results found below, should be transferable to any other developed stock 
market as well. 
 
3 Empirical  Analysis 
3.1 Sample  Description 
We analyze the period 1997-2001 and all initial listings on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
across different stock market segments. Other studies on IPO-research in Germany mainly 
focus on the Neuer Markt, which has become extremely popular in the late nineties and has 
attracted even many foreign companies for their initial offering. Additionally, prior research 
covers a much smaller sample in terms of analyzed IPOs.  
The overallotment option has been used in the IPO process for the first time in Germany in 
1995, but before 1997 most information on the usage of the greenshoe was missing or little 
reliable. We exclude companies that have been traded at a different stock market before going 
public on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange have been excluded. 424 firms fulfilled our 
requirements but we could only obtain all necessary data, like the usage of the greenshoe 
option, for 410 firms.  
As there are different but not always reliable compilations of Initial Public Offerings we 
use the web page and the Factbooks of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and double check our 
list using the company’s homepage or investor relations department, newspaper articles, the 
- 7 - IPO database of the newspaper ‘Börsenzeitung’, and the IPO database of the news provider 
OnVista. The information about the announcement of the greenshoe option are taken from the 
IPO Prospectus, the web pages of the ‘Börsenzeitung’, the company’s web pages and investor 
relations departments. The information about the usage of the overallotment option are taken 
from the web pages of the ‘Börsenzeitung’, ad-hoc information services, the company’s web 
pages and the investor relations departments. Therefore, this is the first time a comprehensive 
database of the usage of the greenshoe option has been collected and analyzed. “The 




3.2  Analysis of the Price Support 
In order to offer concrete evidence for or against the existence of underwriter price 
support it would be necessary to acquire information about which offers have been stabilized. 
Unfortunately, this information is, as for many other stock markets, not available for 
Germany. Therefore, following Ruud (1993) inference is drawn from the distribution of IPO 
returns
4. If IPOs were underpriced deliberately this should lead to a bell-shaped curve with the 
peak of the distribution centered on a positive mean. Figure III shows that initial returns peak 
rather steeply around zero, and that the negative tail of the distribution is significantly 
curtailed. Relatively few IPOs fall much below their offer price.  
It is apparent that the log-returns are not symmetrically distributed and that a relative high 
number of IPOs have first-day returns close to zero, which may be due to this censoring 
effect. The skewness and kurtosis are 1.3071 and 4.0198, respectively. These findings have 
been confirmed for other stock markets as well. For example, Keloharju (1993) reports that 
                                                 
3 We thank Hermann Göppl for providing the data. 
4 An analysis of underwriter price support using Ruud’s (1993) analysis has been conducted for the German 
market by Kaserer and Kempf (1995) who found no support for stabilizing bids by the underwriter. Mihurko 
(2000) analyzing the German ‘Neuer Markt’ over the period 1997 to 2000 found evidence for stabilizing 
activities by the underwriters. 
- 8 - over the period 1984 to 1989 that initial returns in Finland are skewed to the right and have 
excess kurtosis. Kaserer and Kempf (1995) also report high skewness and excess kurtosis for 
Germany for the period 1983 to 1992. 
 
Please insert Figure I around here 
 
Ruud (1993) finds in her analysis by covering a sample of 463 IPOs over the years 1992 
and 1993, that 25% of the sample has a first-day return of zero and that the one-day return is 
heavily skewed to the right. However, this skewness gradually decreases in the first four 
weeks of trading. This effect has been interpreted as steady removal of underwriter’s price 
support. The distribution of IR1, which is calculated as the division of the first day closing 
price by the IPO offering price, is shown in Figure I. 
As noted above, in order to be consistent with the price support hypothesis proposed by 
Ruud (1993), one should expect a steady decline of skewness in the aftermarket. Table VII 
gives a summarized overview about the distribution of the IPO log-returns over the first 30 
trading days. 
Please insert Table I around here 
 
Skewness, which is based on the third moment of the distribution, declines with the 
number of trading days. The sharp decline during the first 10 trading days suggests that 
underwriter price support decreases over time. The mean is relatively constant over the first 
30 trading days, whereas the minimum drops already in the first week and again sharply in 
week two, three and five suggesting the removal of underwriter price support in the secondary 
market. Therefore, it seems to be reasonable to argue that underwriters do not support the 
issue constantly but time their actions. 
- 9 - Chung, Kryzanowski and Rakita (2000) find, based on summary measures, that skewness 
is positive and always significantly different from zero at the 1% level during the first four 
weeks. The third moment about the mean peaks during the first day of secondary market 
trading and decreases steadily afterwards. 
Fama (1976) finds that monthly stock returns measured in logs are, in contrast to daily 
log-returns, positively skewed and close to normal in terms of kurtosis. The above stated 
results are nearly consistent with Fama’s findings, whereas the daily log returns are neither 
consistent with neither Fama’s (1976) nor Peiró’s (1999) results. 
In order to shed more light on the price support puzzle we are going to have a closer look 
at those IPOs which are commonly supposed to be price supported in the secondary market by 
the underwriter. The literature generally proxies for price supporting activities for initial 
offerings which trade below or at the offering price. Aggarwal (2000) on the other side points 
out that IPOs which trade slightly above the offer price are as well supported by the 
underwriter to reduce the risk of dropping below this important bound. Additionally, Ruud 
(1993) finds that in her sample 95% of the initial returns lie between –5% and +5%. Summing 
up, we first analyze the dynamic return behavior during the first 30 trading days by grouping 
IPOs into quantiles with initial returns below 5%, below –5%, between –5% and +5%, and 
between –5% and 0%. In order to accommodate this selection process we divide the first day 
opening and closing price by the offer price. Focusing, as is normally done, solely on the first 
day closing price would lead to a biased analysis as firms who start poorly are most likely 
supported during the first trading day to avoid a negative cascade. One drawback of this 
methodology is that 11% of the analyzed firms are counted twice as they start for example 
with an initial return below –5% and close at +1% at the end of the first trading day. This 
leads to a slight convergence of the analyzed return patterns, but on the other side grouping 
these 21 firms manually would lead to subjective results.  
 
- 10 - Please insert Figure II around here 
 
Ruud (1993) found that only 8% of IPOs with zero first-day returns exhibit one-week 
subsequent returns greater than 5% and additionally that 69% of IPOs with zero first-day 
return exhibit zero or negative one-week returns. Figure IV shows that firms with an return 
between –5% and +5% during the first day trade slightly below zero during the analyzed 
period and start to increase at the end of the examined time range. The increase of this 
overpricing supports Aggarwal’s (2000) findings that firms with slightly positive returns are 
being supported during the first trading days, too. IPOs which could be considered as very 
‘cold’ offerings (initial return below –5%) decrease rather steeply during time which 
highlights the possible existence of a negative cascade effect as in Welch (1992). 
Surprisingly, there is a clear increase in the return pattern of these stocks at day 28 and 29 
which leads to the conclusion that underwriters start a last desperate bid to push up the stock 
returns. This would be contrary to Ellis, Michaely and O’Hara (2000) who report that IPOs 
are supported by the underwriter on average during the first 21 trading days. 
Aggarwal (2000) points out that underwriter mostly use short sellings to support IPOs 
during secondary market trading. In order to facilitate this they sell more shares than initially 
offered by the issuer, e.g. 115 %. This overallotment can lead to two possible scenarios: First, 
the market price drops below the offer price in this case the underwriter buys the securities 
back in the secondary markets to cover the short position. Second, the market price is above 
the offer price, now the short position can be covered by using the greenshoe option (i.e. 
buying additional stocks from the issuer). As the gross margin depends on the shares 
distributed the only situation in which an underwriter would not exercise the greenshoe option 
is if he has to support the IPO through purchasing stocks in the open market. Therefore, in 
order to shed more light on how underwriter possible support IPOs and on how the usage of 
- 11 - the overallotment option affects the returns patterns, we focus on offerings where this 
derivative has been announced initially but not exercised afterwards. 
 
Please insert Figure III around here 
 
Inspecting the return pattern of newly public firms with an initial return during the first 
trading days between –5% and +5% it becomes apparent that IPOs where the greenshoe has 
been used perform much better than firms where it has not been exercised. This is quite 
surprising as the usage of the total overallotment option leads to the conclusion that these 
firms have not been supported by the underwriter, at least not using this derivative. For 
offerings where the underwriters have covered the short position through purchasing stocks in 
the secondary market show a clear decreasing trend of the stock returns. Therefore, one has to 
conclude that the market decides quite early which stocks are so called ‘winner’ and therefore 
worth buying and stocks and which are ‘losers’ and therefore less attractive. Analyzing 
offerings with an initial return being below –5% shows again that price support of the 
underwriter by using the overallotment option does not seem to be very effective. Rather 
surprising is the fact that the greenshoe has been used in three cases representing 7% of this 
quantile and therefore additional shares have been bought at the issue price by the 
underwriter.  
Having a closer look at the usage of the greenshoe option shows that for 83% of all IPOs 
with an overpricing of more than 5% and for 49% of all IPOs with an initial return between –
5% and +5% the greenshoe has not been used by the underwriter to cover his short position. 
Therefore we can conclude that the overallotment option is indeed quite often used to support 
newly listed firms in the secondary market, but seems not to be very effective in terms of 
pushing up the share price and therefore avoiding a negative price trend. Concluding the 
analysis of potentially stabilized IPOs it should be noted that offerings with no greenshoe 
- 12 - announced exhibit a more random pattern and therefore one could conclude that this option 
has at least some stabilizing impact on the return patterns during the first trading days. 
 
4 Conclusion 
As the overallotment option has become very popular in Germany and is nowadays 
included in nearly every new issue, we analyze the effectiveness of this tool and its impact on 
the return pattern during the first trading days for the first time. Additionally we provide 
evidence for the prevalence of price support activities in Germany by the underwriter while 
examining the distribution of first-day returns, and especially negative or zero first-day 
returns.  
In line with Aggarwal (2000), we find that the greenshoe option seems to be the tool for 
price stabilizing activities. In addition, we have to conclude from our analysis of the 
greenshoe usage that short covering does not seem to be very effective in supporting IPOs in 
the secondary market. In line with Arosio et. al. (2000), we therefore have to conclude that a 
small group of IPOs are immediately pointed out by investors as a not profitable investment 
and consequently do not benefit from price support. It seems, by analyzing the return patterns, 
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- 15 - Figure I 
Histogram of first day returns 
The sample covers the 1997 – 2001 period and 410 firm. The initial public offerings were taken from the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange web pages and Factbooks and always double checked with the company’s prospectus, homepage or investor 
relations department, the IPO database of the ‘Börsenzeitung’ and the IPO database of OnVista. The initial return (IR1) 
returns are calculated as ln(Pt/Poffer), where Poffer is the offering price at the end of the bookbuilding range and Pt is the first 









































 Table I 
Characteristics of the holding period returns for the first 30 trading days 
The sample covers the 1997 – 2001 period and 410 firm. The initial public offerings were taken from the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange web pages and Factbooks and always double checked with the company’s prospectus, homepage or investor 
relations department, the IPO database of the ‘Börsenzeitung’ and the IPO database of OnVista. Initial returns (IRt)are 
calculated as ln(Pt/Poffer), where Pt is the market price at time t, which ranges from 0 (offer price at day 1) to 30 (closing price 
at day 30), and Poffer is the offer price at the end of the bookbuilding period. 
 
  IR0 IR1 IR5 IR10 IR15 IR20 IR25 IR30
Mean  0.2739 0.2752 0.2812 0.2756 0.2728 0.2730 0.2728 0.2761 
Median  0.1196 0.1233 0.1806 0.1611 0.1651 0.1521 0.1729 0.1533 
Maximum  1.6740 1.6740 1.9640 1.8871 2.1715 2.0020 1.9923 2.1747 
Minimum  -0.2877 -0.2877 -0.4249 -0.5798 -0.6229 -0.7687 -1.0554 -1.1632 
Std. dev.  0.3680 0.3679 0.4049 0.4366 0.4701 0.4703 0.4938 0.5212 
Skewness  1.3158 1.3071 1.1476 0.9378 1.0803 0.8603 0.7889 0.7479 
Kurtosis  4.0360 4.0198 4.2797 3.5889 4.3259 3.6334 3.6682 3.7468 
 
 Figure II 
Time pattern of holding returns of IPOs  
The sample covers the 1997 – 2001 period and 410 firm. The initial public offerings were taken from the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange web pages and Factbooks and always double checked with the company’s prospectus, homepage or investor 
relations department, the IPO database of the ‘Börsenzeitung’ and the IPO database of OnVista. The initial return (IR(t)) is 
calculated as ln(Pt/Poffer), where Pt is the market price at time t, which ranges from 0 (offer price at day 1) to 30 (closing price 
at day 30), and Poffer is the offer price at the end of the bookbuilding period. IPOs are grouped into quantiles with an initial 
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 Figure III 
Time pattern of holding returns of IPOs and the use of the Greenshoe option 
The sample covers the 1997 – 2001 period and 410 firm The Initial Public Oofferings were taken from the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange web pags and Factboos and always double checked with the compans prospectus, company’s  homepage or 
investor relations department, the IPO database of the ‘Börsenzeitung’ and the IPO database of OnVista. The initial return 
(IR(t)) is calculated as ln(Pt/Poffer), where Pt is the market price at time t, which ranges from 0 (offer price at day 1) to 30 
(closing price at day 30), and Poffer is the offer price at the end of the bookbuilding period. IPOs are grouped into quantiles 
with an initial return (IR1 or IR0) below 5%, below –5%, between –5% and +5%, and between –5% and 0%. ‘GS used’ and 
‘GS not used’ refer to the situation in which the greenshoe (GS) option has been exercised and not exercised, respectively. 
For some IPOs no overallotment option has been announced in the prospectus which has been labelled ‘no GS announced’. 
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IR < -5%
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